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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS-CIVIL
FORFEITURE AND INNOCENT OWNERS
Bennis v. Michigan,
116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
In September, 1988, John and Tina Bennis jointly purchased a 1977
Pontiac sedan for $600.00.' On October 3, 1988, John Bennis engaged in
a sexual act with a prostitute in the Pontiac2 and was arrested for gross
indecency.3  The State of Michigan then filed a civil forfeiture action
against both John and Tina Bennis to have their car declared a nuisance and
abated.4 At the nuisance abatement5 hearing on November 2, 1988,6 Tina
1. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 995, 997 (1996). Tina Bennis "provided most of
the money used to purchase the car through babysitting and similar jobs." Petitioner's Brief
at 2, Bennis (No. 94-8729).
2. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. Police officers observed the prostitute, Kathy
Polarchio, "performing an act of fellatio on Mr. Bennis." Michigan ex rel. Wayne Co.
Prosecutor v. Bennis, 527 N.W.2d 483, 486 (Mich. 1994).
3. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 996. John Bennis was arrested under MICH. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.338(b) for gross indecency. Id.
4. The nuisance abatement statutes under which John and Tina Bennis were sued
provide, in pertinent part: "Any... vehicle ... used for the purpose of... prostitution...
is hereby declared a nuisance... and nuisances shall be enjoined and abated .... Any
person ... who owns ... any... vehicle ... used for any of the purposes ... set forth in
this section is guilty of a nuisance." MICH. COw. LAWS ANN. § 600.3801 (West Supp.
1996).
The Michigan legislature amended this statute in 1988, and the amendments were in
effect when John Bennis was arrested. Michigan ex rel., 527 N.W.2d at 491 & n.23.
Section 600.3815(2) provides: "[p]roof of knowledge of the existence of the nuisance
on the part of the defendants or any of them, is not required." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 600.3815(2) (West 1987). Further, § 600.3825 states in pertinent part:
Sec .3825(1) Order of abatement. If the existence of the nuisance is established...
an order of abatement shall be entered as a part of the judgment in the case ....
(3) Sale of personalty, costs, liens, balance to state treasurer. Upon the sale of any
... vehicle.., the officer executing the order of the court- shall, after deducting the
expenses of keeping such property and costs of such sale ... pay the balance to the
state treasurer to be credited to the general fund of the state.
MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.3825(1), (3) (West 1987). The purpose of the nuisance
abatement statute is "to remedy the inevitable decline of vice-laden neighborhoods."
Michigan ex rel., 527 N.W.2d at 491.
5. The abatement of a nuisance may be defined as "[tihe removal, stoppage,
prostration, or destruction of that which causes a nuisance." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1066 (6th ed. 1990).
6. Petitioner's Brief at 3, Bennis (No. 94-8729). The Michigan Supreme Court,
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Bennis7 argued that her interest in the car was not subject to forfeiture
because she had no knowledge that her husband used the Pontiac to violate
Michigan's indecency law.' The Wayne County Circuit Court declared the
car a nuisance and ordered its confiscation. 9
The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that under
Michigan case law, proof of knowledge is required for forfeiture" and the
record did not demonstrate that the defendant knew about her husband's
illegal activity." In the Michigan Supreme Court, the defendant chal-
lenged the constitutionality of Michigan's abatement scheme and argued that
it violated her Fourteenth Amendment right to due process.' 2 The Michi-
gan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and held that, despite the
defendant's innocence, her claim was "without constitutional consequence"
because the Pontiac was neither stolen nor driven without her consent.' 3
Michigan ex rel., 527 N.W.2d at 486, and the United States Supreme Court, Bennis, 116 S.
Ct. at 996, incorrectly implied that John Bennis was convicted before Michigan filed its civil
action against Mr. and Mrs. Bennis. Petitioner's Brief at 3 n.2, Bennis (No. 94-8729). John
Bennis did not plead guilty to a misdemeanor indecency charge until January 27, 1989. Id.
He was fined $250.00 and ordered to perform community service. Id.
7. Although Michigan initially sued both John and Tina Bennis, only Tina Bennis
petitioned the Supreme Court for certiorari. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 994. Tina Bennis,
therefore, will hereinafter be referred to as "the defendant."
8. Id. at 997.
9. Id. In reaching his decision, the trial judge recognized his "remedial discretion."
Id. He took into account the fact that John and Tina Bennis owned another vehicle and,
therefore, the forfeiture did not leave them without transportation. Id. The judge also noted
that he had the "authority to order the payment of one-half of the sale proceeds, after the
deduction of costs," to the defendant. Id. He declined to do so, however, because given the
"age and value of the car," there would be almost nothing left to award the defendant after
costs. Id.
10. State v. Bennis, 504 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
11. Id. The Michigan Court of Appeals also held, alternatively, that "a single incident
is insufficient to establish a nuisance." Id. at 734. Mr. Bennis' conduct, therefore, did not
constitute a nuisance that subjected the Pontiac to abatement because the State only
established that he used the Pontiac for gross indecency on one occasion. Id. Furthermore,
the court determined that an act of prostitution did not take place in the Pontiac because there
was no proof that Mr. Bennis paid Kathy Polarchio. Id. at 734-35.
12. Michigan ex rel., 527 N.W.2d at 493-94. The Fourteenth Amendment provides,
in pertinent part, that "[n]o state shall ... deprive any person of ... property, without due
process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The defendant first raised her due process
challenge to the Michigan abatement scheme in the Michigan Supreme Court. Respondent's
Brief at 5, Bennis, (No. 94-8729). She also argued that Michigan took her interest in the
Pontiac "for public use without compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment." Bennis,
116 S. Ct. at 998. This Note, however, will focus solely on the due process issue. For a
discussion of Takings law, see J. Kelly Strader, Taking the Wind Out of the Government's
Sails?: Forfeitures and Just Compensation, 23 PEPP. L. REv. 449 (1996).
13. Michigan ex rel., 527 N.W.2d at 494. The court relied on Calero-Toledo v.
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On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed.' 4 An
owner's interest in property is subject to forfeiture when the owner entrusts
the property to a party who uses it to commit a crime, even if the owner has
no knowledge of the illegal use. Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
Forfeiture may be defined as "the divestiture without compensation of
property used in a manner contrary to the laws of the sovereign."' 5
Although forfeiture is an ancient practice,16 its constitutional validity has
only recently been seriously questioned.' 7 Historically, the Supreme Court
has relied on a legal fiction-that the property itself is guilty-to confiscate
property without regard to the Constitution. 8 Cloaking itself in the "guilty
property fiction," the Court has virtually ignored the property owner's
culpability. In Bennis, the Court decided whether an owner's interest in
property is subject to forfeiture when the owner entrusts the property to a
party who uses it to commit a crime, even if the owner has no knowledge
of the illegal use.' 9
Under both state and federal law, property may be forfeited as part of
either criminal or civil proceedings.2 ° Criminal forfeiture is "a proceeding
in personam, an action against the person."2' Because the forfeiture
proceeding is part of the criminal process, the defendant is afforded constitu-
tional protections. 2  In contrast, civil forfeiture "is a proceeding in rem,
an action against the thing., 23 Therefore, "the government need not prove
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) and Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465
(1926). In both cases, the Supreme Court upheld forfeitures of property where the property
owners consented to the use of their property, but not the illegal manner in which it was
used. Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 669; Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 467.
The Michigan Supreme Court also held that: (1) Mr. Bennis engaged in an indecent act,
(2) his conduct rendered the Pontiac subject to abatement, and (3) regardless of prior
Michigan case law, an innocent co-owner's property interest may be forfeited. Michigan ex
rel., 527 N.W.2d at 489, 492.
14. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1001.
15. United States v. Eight Rhodesian Stone Statues, 449 F. Supp. 193, 195 n.1 (1978)
(citing 21 AM. JUR. 2D Customs Duties and Import Regulations § 125 (1965)).
16. See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
17. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Van Oster v. Kansas, 272 U.S. 465 (1926).
19. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 998.
20. Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1340 (1991).
21. David S. Romantz, Note, Civil Forfeiture and the Constitution-A Legislative
Abrogation of Rights and the Judicial Response: The Guilt of the Res, 28 SUFFOLK U. L.
REv. 387, 389 (1994).
22. Id.
23. Id. at 390. The nuisance abatement statute at issue in Bennis "subjects all who
might become nuisance abatement defendants to the possible equitable penalty of loss of the
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that the owner committed the violation which supposedly justifies the
forfeiture. The property is the defendant. 24  Thus, only the property's
guilt is at issue.25
The government prosecutes property because it is deemed to be tainted
by illegal activity.26 Consequently, forfeited property generally belongs in
one of three categories: (1) contraband, (2) proceeds, or (3) instrumentali-
ties.27 Contraband is "anything prohibited by law from being imported,
exported, or even possessed. 2 8  Proceeds are the profits derived from
illegal activity, including money and goods.2 9  Instrumentalities are
property that is intended for use, even tangentially, in criminal activity.
30
The origins of in rem forfeiture can be traced back to the Bible,3
ancient Greece,32 and Anglo-Saxon law.33  Three different types of
forfeiture existed under English common law: (1) forfeiture of estate,34 (2)
property at issue, even though the action is brought inpersonam." Respondent's Brief at 37,
Bennis (No. 94-8729). Thus, while Michigan sued John and Tina Bennis, the action was,
essentially, in rem against their Pontiac.
24. Tamara R. Piety, Comment, Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil
Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process,45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911, 916 (1991)
(footnote omitted).
25. Id.
26. Romantz, supra note 21, at 390.




31. See, e.g., Michael F. Zeldin & Roger G. Weiner, Innocent Third Parties and
Their Rights in Forfeiture Proceedings, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 843, 843 & n. 1 (1991) ("If
an ox gore a man or woman and they die, then the ox shall be stoned and his flesh not eaten;
but the owner of the ox shall be quit [freed of further obligation].") (quoting Exodus 21:28).
This is a "perfect forfeiture." Id. at 843. The owner's culpability is uncertain, but the ox
is deemed guilty. Id. Therefore, the ox is forfeited and "the owner denied the right to eat
ox steaks." Id.
32. Walter J. Van Eck, Note, The New Oregon Civil Forfeiture Law, 26 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REv. 449, 451 & n. 15 (1990). "'[W]e banish beyond our borders sticks and stones
... if they chance to kill a man .... ' Id. (quoting Eschines the Greek (389-314 B.C.)).
33. Romantz, supra note 21, at 393 ("Under Anglo-Saxon law, noxal surrender
involved forfeiting the instrumentality of death or injury to the sovereign. The guilt of the
res, independent from individual culpability, was premised on an ecclesiastical 'possession';
the resulting death or injury demonstrated the 'demonic culpability' of the thing.").
34. Jon E. Gordon, Note, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They
Love: Money Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DuKE L.J. 744, 746 (1995).
Forfeiture of estate is also known as "escheat upon attainder." See Robert Lieske, Civil
Forfeiture Law: Replacing the Common Law with a Common Sense Application of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 21 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 265, 271
(1995).
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deodand" and (3) forfeiture by statute.16 Forfeiture of estate, or criminal
forfeiture, was based on the theory that the Crown "retained a superior
interest in all property."37  Thus, upon conviction, felons and traitors
forfeited all real and personal property to the Crown. 38 In contrast, the
Crown brought deodand39 actions to recover the value of an object that
struck and killed an innocent victim.4° The object was deemed guilty and
the Crown proceeded against the thing itself.4'
The original justification for deodand actions is unknown, but several
theories have been advanced, including: (1) forfeiture of the object's value
cleansed the property,42 (2) forfeiture was "a substitute for revenge by the
decedent's relatives against the owner of the offending object," '43 (3)
forfeiture provided "money to say Mass for the victim's soul," (4)
forfeiture provided money for charity,45 and (5) forfeiture punished the
property's owner because the owner's negligence was, in part, responsible
for the victim's death.46 In 1846, with the dawn of the industrial age and
a large increase in the number of accidental deaths, deodand actions were
abolished in England.47
The Crown also confiscated property for violations of customs and
shipping statutes. 4' A ship master's failure to pay a customs duty "could
subject the shipowner to forfeiture of his cargo and sometimes his ship." '49
As in deodand actions, the Crown proceeded in rem against the goods or the
vessel. 50  In the 1600s, Parliament enacted the Navigation Acts51 "to
35. Lieske, supra note 34, at 271.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 272.
38. Gordon, supra note 34, at 746.
39. "The word 'deodand' derives from the Latin Deo dandum meaning 'given to
God."' Piety, supra note 24, at 928.
40. Id. at 929.
41. Gordon, supra note 34, at 746.
42. Piety, supra note 24, at 929.
43. Id.
44. Lieske, supra note 34, at 274.
45. Id.
46. Piety, supra note 24, at 930.
47. James E. Beaver et al., Civil Forfeiture and the Eighth AmendmentAfter Austin,
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1995). At the same time, Parliament passed the "Act for
Compensating the Families of Persons Killed by Accidents." Lord Campbell's Act, 1846,
9 & 10 Vict., ch. 62 (Eng.). This Act created a wrongful death cause of action. Piety, supra
note 24, at 930-31 & n.89.
48. James R. Maxeiner, Bane of American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62
CORNELL L. REV. 768, 774 (1977).
49. Id.
50. Gordon, supra note 34, at 747.
51. See L. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-CENTuRY
1996]
TENNESSEE LAW REVIEW
promote national seapower. ''52 The Acts "required the shipping of most
commodities in English built, owned, and manned vessels. Violations...
resulted in forfeiture of both the illegally carried goods and the ship that
transported them."53 Statutory forfeitures were "usually imposed... in the
Exchequer, the court of the King's revenue"54 and "appealed to the English
Crown ... because [they] were the principal means of tax enforcement."55
Of the three types of English forfeiture, only statutory forfeiture became
part of American law.56 During the colonial era, American vice-admiralty
courts enforced the Navigation Acts "which by their terms were applicable
to the colonies."57 When customs officials seized ships or cargo, the court
proceeded against the object in rem without a jury.
This mode of trial allowed customs officers to not only secure the payment
of fines due the Crown, but also prevented an offending vessel from being
further engaged in illegal trade. In rem process was necessary because of
the frequent impossibility of determining either ownership of the vessel or
the identities of those engaged in smuggling.59
After the ratification of the United States Constitution, the first Congress
"passed forfeiture statutes to aid in the collection of customs duties, which
provided 80-90% of the finances for the federal government during that
time." 60  To enforce the new revenue and tariff acts, Congress gave the
federal courts jurisdiction over "all seizures under laws of impost, naviga-
tion, or trade of the United States."' Forfeiture proceedings in the new
federal court system were in rem "since federal forfeiture statutes were
I-A2largely patterned on the English navigation and customs statutes ....
EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING 387-414 (1964) (digest of Acts).
52. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 774.
53. HARPER, supra note 51, at 109.
54. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 775.
55. Id. at 773.
56. Gordon, supra note 34, at 747. "Deodand never became part of American
law. Forfeiture of estate for treason was constitutionally proscribed except
during the traitor's natural life, and the First Congress abolished forfeiture of
estate as punishment for felons." Id. In 1970, Congress passed The Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1988), and The Controlled
Substances Act, 21 U. S.C. § 848 (1988), thereby resurrecting felony forfeiture of estate. Van
Eck, supra note 32, at 450 & n.6.
57. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 777.
58. Matthew P. Harrington, Rethinking In Rem: The Supreme Court's New (and
Misguided) Approach to Civil Forfeiture, 12 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 281, 291-92 (1994).
59. Id. at 292.
60. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 782 n.86.
61. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
62. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 780.
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Thus, the original justification for American civil forfeiture statutes "rested
on the power of the government to regulate and protect its revenue.',63
The first American cases that upheld in rem forfeitures were brought
under admiralty law.' In The Palmyra,65 decided in 1827, a vessel,
named the Palmyra, committed acts of "piratical aggression" in violation of
a federal statute.66 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the forfeiture of the
ship even though neither the ship's crew nor its owners had been convicted
of piracy.67  The Court reasoned that in rem actions do not depend on
whether any other defendant is joined in personam, because "[t]he thing is
here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached
primarily to the thing."'6 Thus, the guilty property fiction was implanted
in American jurisprudence.
Almost twenty years later, in United States v. Cargo of the Brig Malek
Adhel,69 the Court faced a similar situation. The captain of the Malek
Adhel performed acts of piracy on a voyage from New York to California
in violation of federal law.70 In Brig Malek Adhel, however, the ship's
owners were admittedly innocent.7 Granting forfeiture, the Court held that
"[t]he vessel which commits the aggression is treated as the offender ...
without any reference whatsoever to the character or conduct of the
owner. 72 The Court explained that "this is done from the necessity of the
case, as the only adequate means of suppressing the offence or wrong, or
insuring an indemnity to the injured party.1
73
The most important aspect of these early forfeiture cases is the
justification provided for the expansion of civil forfeiture to innocent
property owners. [The] Court held that the forfeitures were closely tied to
the functional necessities of enforcing admiralty, piracy, and customs laws.
In rem forfeiture permitted courts to obtain jurisdiction over property when
it was virtually impossible to obtain in personam jurisdiction over the
property owners. Therefore, the government could ensure that customs
63. Id. at 783.
64. Piety, supra note 24, at 935. "One of the first recorded cases was United
States v. La Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796) (holding that a jury in civil
forfeiture was not required because forfeiture was properly under admiralty
jurisdiction, which did not traditionally provide for jury trials)." Id. at 935 n. 109.
65. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
66. Id. at 8.
67. See id. at 14-15.
68. Id. at 14.
69. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
70. Id. at 210.
71. Id. at 233.
72. Id.
73. Id. (emphasis added).
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laws were enforced even if the owner of the ship or the cargo was outside
the court's jurisdiction.7
Thus, the original justification for in rem proceedings rested on the need to
enforce forfeiture statutes and thereby protect the government's revenue.
The Civil War, however, "brought about a radical change" in forfeiture
law.75 During the war, southern rebels could not be prosecuted for treason
because they were "safely behind Confederate lines. 76 Furthermore, the
United States government could not confiscate Confederate-owned property
located in the North because the rebels "were considered citizens, not aliens,
and were entitled to full constitutional rights. Therefore, in absentia
prosecutions were forbidden. 7 7 To solve this problem, Congress narrowly
passed a confiscation bill permitting in rem forfeitures.
78
In 1863, the Kentucky Supreme Court found the Confiscation Act
unconstitutional and predicted that "[t]ihese [in rem] proceedings may to-day
be the engines of punishment to the rebels, but, in the future, they may be
the instruments of oppression, injustice and tyranny .... ,9 In 1871,
however, the United States Supreme Court upheld the Confiscation Act's
constitutionality "not on due process grounds, but as an exercise of the war
power in taking enemy property."80 Thus, forfeiture law was expanded in
the 1860s to permit the in rem forfeiture of property where the government
could not obtain in personam jurisdiction over the property owners. "The
result was a revolution in forfeiture law that persists to this day-use of the
in rem action without constitutional limitation. It is unlikely that such a
change would have occurred had it not been for the passions raised by the
Civil War."'"
74. Brief of the Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9,
Bennis (No. 94-8729) [hereinafter Brief of the Institute for Justice].
75. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 785.
76. Id. at 785-86.
77. Id at 786.
78. Id. at 786-87; see Act of July 7, 1862, 12 Stat. 589.
The advocates of confiscation contended that forfeitures under the customs statutes
demonstrated that all in rem forfeitures constituted due process of law. The opponents
argued that proceedings under the proposed bill would constitute criminal prosecutions
of the rebel property owners, since confiscation could occur only upon a finding that the
owner was guilty of treason.... If the government could proceed in rem to punish
treason, nothing would stop it from proceeding similarly to punish lesser crimes. The
proponents of the bill urged the necessity of the hour ....
Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 786 (footnotes omitted).
79. Id. at 787 & n. II (quoting Norris v. Doniphan, 61 Ky. (4 Met.) 385,426 (1863)).
80. Id. at 787 & n. 112 (footnotes omitted); see Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.)
331 (1871); Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871); McVeigh v. United
States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 259 (1871).
81. Maxeiner, supra note 48, at 787 (footnotes omitted).
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In the late 1870s and early 1920s, the United States Supreme Court
further extended the guilty property fiction to uphold forfeitures for
violations of tax revenue laws and prohibition statutes. In Dobbins's
Distillery v. United States, 2 a distillery owner leased his facility and,
unbeknownst to him, the lessor violated provisions of a revenue law. 3
Citing both The Palmyra and Brig Malek Adhel, the Court upheld forfeiture
of the distillery and all real and personal property used in connection with
its operation.84 The Court again held that the property itself was guilty
regardless of the "personal misconduct or responsibility of the owner." 5
In J W. Goldsmith, Jr. -Grant Co. v. United States, 6 the Grant Compa-
ny sold an automobile to a taxi driver, but retained title to the car until it
was paid in full.8 The Court upheld forfeiture of the car when the cab
driver used it to violate a revenue statute.88 The company had no knowl-
edge of the illegal acts committed by the cab driver.89 Once again, the
Court relied on the guilty property fiction to explain its decision.9" The
Court also introduced a new justification for civil forfeiture: The governme-
nt's interest in preventing violation or evasion of its laws outweighed the
innocent owner's property interest. 9' Finally, the Court stated that whether
the reasons for civil forfeiture were "artificial or real, it is too firmly fixed
in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now dis-
placed.
92
During the era of Prohibition, the Supreme Court decided Van Oster v.
Kansas,93 in which it rejected an innocent owner's Fourteenth Amendment
due process challenge to civil forfeiture.94 The plaintiff in Van Oster
entrusted her automobile to another party and, without her knowledge, that
party used the car to illegally transport alcohol. 95 The government sought
forfeiture and sale of the car as a nuisance under a Kansas statute. 96 As
82. 96 U.S. 395 (1877).
83. Id. at 396.
84. Id. at 400-01.
85. Id. at 401.
86. 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
87. Id. at 509.
88. Id. at 511.
89. Id. at 509, 513.
90. Id. at 511.
91. See id. at 510.
92. Id. at 511.
93. 272 U.S. 465 (1926). For other cases dealing with civil forfeiture during this era
see United States v. One Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219 (1939); Dodge v. United States, 272 U.S.
530 (1926); and United States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926).
94. Van Oster, 272 U.S. at 466-67.
95. Id. at 465-66.
96. Id. at 466.
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in previous cases, the Court relied on precedent to sanction the forfeiture.97
The Court further explained the confiscation by reasoning that civil
forfeiture "builds a secondary defense against a forbidden use and precludes
evasions by dispensing with the necessity of judicial inquiry as to collusion
between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner."98
In 1970, forfeiture was reincarnated as a weapon against crime when
Congress enacted a federal civil forfeiture statute99 and two criminal
forfeiture laws.'00  The new civil forfeiture statute provided for the
forfeiture of "[i]llegal drugs and the materials used in their manufacture,
processing, and distribution," as well as conveyances.' 01 It also supplied
an innocent owner defense where (1) the conveyance was a common carrier
and the owner did not consent to its illegal use10 2 or (2) the conveyance
was stolen from its owner and used in an illegal activity. 03
Then, in 1974, the United States Supreme Court decided Calero-Toledo
v. Pearson Yacht'Leasing Co.' °4 The Pearson Yacht Company leased a
yacht, and the lessees used the conveyance to transport narcotics without
Pearson's knowledge.0 5 The Court upheld the yacht's forfeiture and
rejected Pearson's claim that the divestiture was an unconstitutional taking
of property without compensation.0 6 Not surprisingly, the Court relied
on The Palmyra and its progeny to rationalize the forfeiture.'0 7 The
Calero-Toledo Court also suggested additional justifications for civil
forfeiture: It prevents further illegal use of the property, imposes an
"economic penalty" that renders criminal activity unprofitable, and may
induce property owners to "exercise greater care in transferring possession
of their property."'8 The Court also acknowledged, however, that:
97. Id. at 468.
98. Id. at 467-68.
99. The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881
(1988).
100. See The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988)); The Controlled Substances Act, Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Offense (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988)).
101. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(l)-(3), (5) (1988).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(A) (1988).
103. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(B) (1988). The statute was broadened in 1978 and 1984
to provide for the forfeiture of drug proceeds and real property. Van Eck, supra note 32.
The innocent owner defense was also amended in 1988 "to preclude forfeiture for prohibited
use where that use occurred 'without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the
owner."' Id.
104. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
105. Id. at 665, 668.
106. Id. at 669.
107. Id. at 683-86.
108. Id. at 686-88.
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[I]t would be difficult to reject the constitutional claim.. . of an owner
who proved not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the
wrongful activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property; for, in that
circumstance, it would be difficult to conclude that forfeiture served
legitimate purposes and was not unduly oppressive.'0 9
Throughout the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s, the use of civil forfeiture
exploded. In 1991 alone, "more than two billion dollars worth of property
was forfeited to the federal goverment."'' 0 As a result, commentators
alleged that the government was abusing its power."' Scholars also
criticized the lack of constitutional protections for those at risk of losing
their property through civil forfeiture. 12  Finally, both Congress and the
Supreme Court responded. Congress proposed legislation to limit the scope
of federal civil forfeiture," 3 and the Supreme Court decided five forfeiture
cases against the government during its 1992-93 Term.
1 4
109. Id. at 689-90.
110. Lieske, supra note 34, at 266-67.
111. Douglas S. Reinhart, Note, Applying the Eighth Amendment to Civil Forfeiture
AfterAustin v. United States: Excessiveness and Proportionality, 36 WM. & MARY L. REv.
235, 236 (1994).
112. See generally Piety, supra note 24 (arguing that the legal fictions used to justify
civil forfeiture have the effect of "crushing every due process claim" raised in protest of the
doctrine).
113. Michele M. Jochner, From Fiction to Fact: The Supreme Court's Re-Evaluation
of CivilAsset ForfeitureLaws, 82 ILL. B.J. 560, 567 (1994). In November, 1993, however,
the Justice Department "requested a delay of any congressional action" until it could perform
its own review of the federal forfeiture statutes. Id.
114. See United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 46 (1993)
(holding that absent "exigent circumstances, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
prohibits the Government in a civil forfeiture case from seizing real property without first
affording the owner notice and an opportunity to be heard"); Austin v. United States, 509
U.S. 602, 604 (1993) (holding that the "Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment
applies to forfeitures of property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7)" and remanding
the case for determination of whether the forfeiture at issue was excessive); United States v.
92 Buena Vista Avenue, 507 U.S. 111, 114-18 (1993) (holding that "an owner's lack of
knowledge . . . that her home had been purchased with the proceeds of illegal drug
transactions constitutes a defense to a forfeiture proceeding under ... 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)
(6)"); Republic Nat'l Bank v. United States; 506 U.S. 80, 81-82, 93 (1992) (holding that an
appellate court "may continue to exercise jurisdiction in an in rem civil forfeiture proceeding
after the res, then in the form of cash, is removed ... from the judicial district and deposited
in the United States Treasury"). The fifth case, Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544
(1993), like Austin, was remanded for consideration of whether the forfeiture "resulted in an




Of these cases, Austin v. United States"' was deemed the most
significant.' 6 In Austin, the Court analyzed the guilty property fiction and
concluded that it rested "at bottom, on the notion that the owner has been
negligent in allowing his property to be misused and he is properly punished
for that negligence."' " Consequently, forfeiture is, at least in part,
punitive."' The Court then held that forfeiture proceedings under 21
U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7) are punishment and therefore, "subject to the
limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.""' 9
In reaching its decision in Austin, the Court appeared to treat the
property owner, rather than the property, as the real party in interest.
20
Consequently, commentators heralded Austin as the death knell for the guilty
property fiction and proclaimed a new trend toward greater constitutional
protections in civil forfeiture proceedings.' In this expectant atmosphere,
the Court decided Bennis v. Michigan.
In Bennis v. Michigan,2 2 a five-four decision, the Supreme Court held
that an owner's interest in property is subject to forfeiture when the owner
entrusts the property to a party who uses it to commit a crime, even if the
owner has no knowledge of the illegal use.'23 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and O'Connor, authored the plurality opinion.
124
Rehnquist's analysis centered primarily on stare decisis'25 and determined
that the Fourteenth Amendment right to due process is not implicated when
an innocent owner's property is forfeited to the state.
l2 6
First, the Court briefly discussed the facts that led to the forfeiture of
the defendant's car'27 and then reviewed Bennis' procedural history.'28
115. 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
116. Beaver, supra note 47, at 43.
117. Austin, 509 U.S. at 615.
118. Id. at 618.
119. Id. at 622.
120. Robert M. Sondak, The Mysterious Civil Forfeiture Laws, 68 FLA. B.J. 22, 26
(1994).
121. Jochner, supra note 113, at 567 ("These recent developments in civil forfeiture
law strip away, for the first time, the ancient fictions in favor of protection of individual
liberties and rights."); Romantz, supra note 21, at 432 ("[T]he Austin Court implicitly
rejected any reliance on the fiction of the guilty res as grounds for immunizing civil
forfeitures from constitutional scrutiny."); Sondak, supra note 120, at 26 ("[Austin] has, in
large measure, stripped the civil forfeiture laws of its (sic] legal fictions. Civil forfeiture
cases are now far more likely to be adjudicated on the merits of the owner's... actions,
rather than the fiction that the property committed a wrong.").
122. 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996).
123. Id. at 1001.
124. Id. at 996.
125. Id. at 998.
126. Id. at 995-96.
127. Id. at 996.
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The Court carefully noted the trial judge's "remedial discretion," the Bennis'
second automobile, and the judge's "authority to order the payment of one-
half of the sale proceeds, after the deduction of costs," to the innocent
owner. 2 9 Further, the Court pointed out that the Michigan Supreme Court
emphasized that the nuisance abatement proceeding was an "equitable
action.'
130
Next, the Court stated unequivocally that the defendant's innocence was
irrelevant because "a long and unbroken line of cases holds that an owner's
interest in property may be forfeited by reason of the use to which the
property is put even though the owner did not know it was to be put to such
use." 3' Citing The Palmyra and its progeny, the Court explained that it
had historically rejected the property owner's innocence as a defense to civil
forfeiture.' Because the defendant did not distinguish her case from the
Court's precedent, she was "in the same position as the ... owners ... in
the forfeiture cases beginning with The Palmyra in 1827.' Further, the
Court dismissed Calero-Toledo 's innocent owner defense 134 as "obiter
dictum.' 35  Thus, the Court once again abandoned innocent owners and
freshly cemented the guilty property fiction in civil forfeiture law.
The Court then dismantled both the dissent's and the defendant's
remaining arguments. First, the Court rejected the dissent's contention that
The Palmyra line of cases justified forfeiture only when the property's
principal use was for illegal activity. 36 The Court reasoned that its prior
cases had "never made the due process inquiry depend on whether the use
for which the instrumentality 37 was forfeited was the principal use.""'
Unwilling to extinguish the instrumentality argument entirely, however, the
Court reserved opinion on whether an ocean liner could be confiscated due
to the illegal activity of one passenger.
39
Second, the Court gave short shrift to the defendant's argument that the
decision in Austin14 could not be reconciled with the guilty property
fiction. 4' The Court minimized Austin by stating, simply, that there was
no real occasion in Austin to "deal with the validity of the 'innocent-owner
128. Id. at 996-97.
129. Id. at 997; see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
130. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997.
131. Id. at 998.
132. Id. at 998-99.
133. Id. at 999.
134. See supra text accompanying note 109.
135. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999.
136. Id. at 999-1000.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30.
138. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 999-1000.
139. Id. at 1000.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
141. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000.
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defense."" 42 Perhaps searching for a more substantial justification for its
ruling than stare decisis, the Court implied that Austin's holding would not
apply in Bennis because the forfeiture in Bennis was remedial, not
punitive. 43
Finally, in a last attempt to fortify its position, the Court cited Van Oster
and Calero-Toledo for the proposition that forfeiture "serves a deterrent
purpose distinct from any punitive purpose."' 44  Divestiture prevents
illegal use of the property, renders criminal activity unprofitable and thwarts
"collusion between the wrongdoer and the alleged innocent owner."' 45
The Court concluded by stating that the guilty property fiction is "too firmly
fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the country to be now
displaced."' '
Writing separately, Justice Thomas concurred with the plurality opinion,
but wrote to express his concern with the permissive scope of civil forfeiture
and to explain his acquiescence in the judgment. 47 He agreed with the
plurality that precedent precludes a successful due process challenge to civil
forfeiture. 4  Nevertheless, Justice Thomas described the forfeiture in
Bennis as "intensely undesirable."'149 Further, he lent credence to the
dissent's instrumentality argument when he admitted that "[t]he limits on
what property can be forfeited as a result of what wrongdoing" were not
clear to him.'50
Like the plurality, however, Justice Thomas could not distinguish Bennis
from Van Oster.'"' Perhaps to ease his concerns about uncompensated
divestiture, he also decided that if the abatement in Bennis could be
characterized as remedial, "then the more severe problems involved in
punishing someone not found to have engaged in wrongdoing ... do not
arise. ' 52  Ultimately, Thomas left civil forfeiture reform to the states and
Congress.'53
Justice Ginsburg also concurred in the plurality opinion and judgment,
but wrote to "highlight features of the case key to [her] judgment.' 54 For
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 93-98, 104-08.
145. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000-01.
146. Id. at 1001 (citing J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505,
511 (1921)). Near the end of the majority opinion, the Court briefly discussed the Takings
issue, which is beyond the scope of this Note. Id.
147. Id. at 1001-03 (Thomas, J., concurring).
148. Id. at 1001 (Thomas,,J., concurring).
149. Id. at 1001-02 (Thomas, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
151. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring); see supra text accompanying notes 93-98.
152. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1002 (Thomas, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 1003 (Thomas, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
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Ginsburg, the sole question in Bennis was whether the defendant was
entitled to an offset from the sale of the Pontiac, not whether the defendant
was entitled to the car itself' She was satisfied that the Michigan
Supreme Court would "police exorbitant applications" of the forfeiture
statute at issue in Bennis because proceedings under the statute are
"equitable."'' 5 6 Consequently, due to the age and value of the defendant's
Pontiac, the forfeiture in Bennis was not unfair. 15' 7 Thus, Justice Ginsburg
seemed to suggest that if the car had been more valuable, failure to provide
the defendant with an offset from its sale might not have passed constitu-
tional muster. Finally, Justice Ginsburg, like the plurality, signaled her
support for Michigan's attempt to deter illicit activity through in rem
forfeiture.'58
Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Souter and Breyer, dissented from the
majority opinion.'59  Calling the Court's holding novel, the dissent
distinguished Bennis from the precedent relied on by the majority. 60  To
differentiate Bennis, the dissent first presented the instrumentality argu-
ment. '6  The dissent contended, in contrast to the plurality,'62 that early
civil forfeiture cases demonstrate that property can only be forfeited when
its principal use is illegal. 163 In Bennis, however, the defendant's husband
used the car to engage in one isolated incident of illicit activity.
64
Therefore, the vehicle should not be subject to forfeiture as "an instrumen-
tality of crime.'
16 1
Further, precedent also indicates that property must actually facilitate a
crime before it can be confiscated in a civil forfeiture proceeding.
66
While the illegal activity in Bennis occurred in the Pontiac, the car "bore no
necessary connection to the offense committed by [defendant's] hus-
band.' 67  The act could have taken place "in a multitude of other loca-
tions."'16' Thus, the nexus between the crime and the Pontiac was "insuffi-
cient to support forfeiture.' 6 9 In addition, the dissent could not character-
ize the proceeding in Bennis as remedial because the forfeiture would not
155. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
156. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
157. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
158. Id. (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 1003-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
160. Id. at 1004 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1004-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting); seesupra text accompanying notes 26-30.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 136-38.
163. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1005 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 1005-06 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 1006 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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prevent the defendant's husband from "using other venues for ... illegal
rendezvous."170
The dissent then addressed the defendant's innocence."' Citing
Austin,'72 the dissent stated that the forfeiture in Bennis should not have
been permitted because the defendant "was in no way negligent in her use
or entrustment of the family car.' 73 The dissent accused the plurality of
ignoring Austin' 74 and objected to the plurality's dismissal of Calero-
Toledo's innocent owner defense. 
75
Next, the dissent disagreed with the plurality's contention that the
forfeiture in Bennis served as a deterrent.' 76  There was "reason to think
that the threat of forfeiture [would] deter an individual from buying a car
with her husband-or from marrying him in the first place-if she neither
knows nor has reason to know that he plans to use it wrongfully.' 77
Further, the plurality's argument that forfeiture prevents collusion had no
validity in Bennis because it was "patently clear that [the defendant] did not
collude with her husband to carry out this offense.' 78 If anything, the
defendant was a victim of her husband's conduct.'
79
Finally, the dissent returned to Austin and stated that the Court's holding
in Bennis was "dramatically at odds" with Austin.'80 The dissent deter-
mined that the forfeiture in Bennis constituted excessive punishment
because: (1) the defendant was blameless and (2) her husband had
committed only one isolated crime in their car.'"' Therefore, the forfeiture
was "subject to the limitations of the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines
Clause."'8 2  The dissent concluded that the "blatant unfairness" of the
confiscation in Bennis placed it on the unconstitutional side of the line that
separates permissible and impermissible forfeitures.8 3
Writing separately, Justice Kennedy' also dissented from the plurality
opinion. '  Like the plurality, Justice Kennedy focused on the history of
civil forfeiture.8 5 Unlike the plurality, however, he determined that the
170. Id. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. See supra text accompanying notes 115-19.
173. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1007 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
174. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 1008 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 1008-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 1009 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 1010 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
181. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 1010-11 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
185. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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early admiralty cases should not be analogized to automobiles in every
instance.'8 6 Justice Kennedy reasoned that the Court did not have to
overrule its precedent to protect the defendant's interest in her property."8 7
Instead, he suggested a compromise: "[I]t has not been shown that a strong
presumption of negligent entrustment or criminal complicity would be
insufficient to protect the government's interest where the automobile is
involved in a criminal act in the tangential way that it was here."'88
Justice Kennedy concluded by stating that nothing supports the implication
that the value of the defendant's interest in the Pontiac is "so insignificant
as to be beneath the law's protection."' 8 9
Given the history of civil forfeiture law, the Court's holding in Bennis
is not surprising; the Court's reasoning, however, is quite disturbing. Once
again the Court relied primarily on the guilty property fiction to justify the
forfeiture of an innocent owner's property, but was unable to articulate a
persuasive rationale, other than stare decisis, for its continued adherence to
the fiction.
In the early 1800s, the Court plausibly justified in rem forfeitures based
on the need to enforce customs statutes and protect the government's
revenue.' 90 During the Civil War, Congress sanctioned the in rem forfei-
ture of Confederate-owned property because the government could not
obtain in personam jurisdiction over southern rebels and try them for
treason.'19 Thus, the traditional justification for civil forfei-
ture-protection of the treasury---did not apply to the Civil War forfeitures.
Nevertheless, Congress in effect created a new revenue stream.
Then, in Dobbins's Distillery and Goldsmith-Grant, the Court simply
relied on the guilty property fiction as enunciated in The Palmyra and Brig
Malek Adhel to uphold forfeitures for violation of tax revenue laws.'92
The forfeitures that took place in Dobbins's and Goldsmith-Grant protected
the government's tax base and therefore, are analogous to forfeitures under
early American customs statutes. 93 The in rem nature of the forfeitures,
however, cannot be justified by the inability to obtain in personam
jurisdiction over the property owners. Thus, the Court's reliance on The
Palmyra and The Brig Malek Adhel to explain Dobbins's and Goldsmith-
Grant is unconvincing. It is likely that both the need to collect taxes and
the expansion of in rem forfeiture during the Civil War contributed
significantly to the Court's decisions in Dobbins's and Goldsmith-Grant.
186. Id. at 1011 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
187. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
188. Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
189. See id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
190. See supra text accompanying notes 69-74.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 75-78.
192. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
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Later, in Van Oster and Calero-Toledo, the Court introduced new rationales
for in rem forfeiture but, at bottom, based its decisions on the guilty property
fiction without explanation."9  The confiscations in Van Oster and Calero-
Toledo under alcohol and drug forfeiture statutes cannot be justified by either the
government's need to protect a traditional revenue source or the property owners'
unavailability.
Similarly, none of the original justifications for in rem forfeiture apply to
Bennis. First, the stated purpose of Michigan's nuisance abatement statute was
to deter illegal activity in crime-ridden neighborhoods.195 Second, the Wayne
County Circuit Court actually obtained in personam jurisdiction over the
defendant pursuant to the statute. 96 Thus, the Court's reliance on The Palmyra
and Brig Malek Adhel to sanction the forfeiture of an innocent owner's property
is misplaced. As one commentator pointed out, although "[t]raditionally, the
forfeiture power was narrowly limited in ways that prevented government from
violating individual rights.... As the forfeiture power has strayed from its
historical and common law moorings, governments now use this power without
built-in safeguards and in violation of the Constitution."' 97
The forfeiture. statutes in Van Oster, Calero-Toledo and Bennis indicate that
"the forfeiture power has become one of the most powerful weapons in the
government's arsenal to eliminate vice."' 198 At the same time, forfeiture statutes
provide the government with a thinly disguised revenue stream. In its amicus
brief in support of the defendant, the Institute for Justice suggested that
"Michigan, like many other jurisdictions today, was using the civil forfeiture
power to generate unappropriated revenues for the state [sic] through the
expropriation of private property."' 99
Shortly after the Constitution was ratified, the government employed in rem
civil forfeiture to enforce revenue statutes because customs duties provided the
majority of the government's general revenue.200 Today, however, "law
enforcement agencies keep a percentage of forfeited assets and proceeds."'
As a result, they have a strong motive to enforce laws that employ in rem
forfeiture as a penalty.02 Consequently, the "current institutional arrangement
and incentive structure behind civil forfeiture demand that the property rights of
innocent owners be protected.,
20 3
194. See supra text accompanying notes 93-98, 104-08.
195. See supra note 4.
196. See supra note 23.
197. Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 74, at 13.
198. Id. at 11.
199. Id. at 12.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63.
201. Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 74, at 12 n.6; see JAMES M.
BUCHANAN, CONSTITUTIONAL EcONOMIcs 37-38 (1991).
202. This aspect of civil forfeiture may explain its tremendous explosion in popularity.
See supra text accompanying notes 110-11.
203. Brief of the Institute for Justice, supra note 74, at 12; see also James Daniel
Good, 510 U.S. at 55 (constitutional considerations arise where "the Government has a direct
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In the end, Bennis may be limited to its facts. Both the majority and the
concurrences emphasized the equitable nature of Michigan's abatement scheme,
the age and value of the Pontiac and the trial judge's authority to award an
innocent co-owner her interest in property where appropriate."° Furthermore,
Bennis may ultimately deter future johns, decrease prostitution and protect other
women from the defendant's fate. Nevertheless, Tina Bennis remains a victim
of both her husband's crime and Michigan's forfeiture law. It is surely cold
comfort for her to realize that if her interest in the car had only been more
valuable, she might have received an offset after it was confiscated and sold to
cover costs.
After the Court's 1993 civil forfeiture decisions, Bennis is a major
disappointment. In Austin, the Court seemed to recognize that civil forfeiture,
in general, punishes the property's owner, not the property itself.205 Commen-
tators believed that the guilty property fiction was dead. °6 The Bennis Court,
however, virtually ignored Austin and appeared to limit Austin's holding to
forfeitures that occur under 21 U.S.C. § 881, a drug forfeiture statute.20 7 At the
very least, the Court signaled its reluctance to further expand constitutional
protections for innocent owners whose property is subject to civil forfeiture.
Regardless of whether the Court ultimately restricts the scope ofAustin, however,
the guilty property fiction is alive and well.
Perhaps someday the Court will take a more reasonable approach to innocent
property owners, such as the compromise suggested by Justice Kennedy.
208
Until then, however, the guilty property fiction will remain a fixture in American
jurisprudence. As Justice Holmes wrote in 1897:
It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that ... it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists
from blind imitation of the past.2 9
DEBORAH J. CHALLENER
pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceeding"); Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238,
250 (1980) (constitutional concerns raised when government official's "judgment will be
distorted by the prospect of institutional gain as a result of zealous enforcement efforts").
204. Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 997, 1000, 1002-03; see supra note 9 and accompanying
text.
205. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
206. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
207. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. 994, 1000 (1996). In the Court's latest
forfeiture case, United States v. Ursery, No. 95-345, 1996 WL 340815, *9
(U.S. June 24, 1996), the Court stated that it limited its review in Austin "to the
question 'whether the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment applies
to forfeitures of property under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and (a)(7).'
208. See supra text accompanying note 188.
209. O.W. Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
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